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Improving the Rolling Contract
Abstract

This article addresses the increasingly common problem of buyers finding important contract terms inside the
box of a newly purchased item instead of learning about them before or during purchase. The failure of courts
to develop a satisfactory approach to deciding which contact terms sellers may provide after purchase is of
great significance in light of the rapid proliferation of rolling contracts. In this article, Friedman proposes a
mechanism that will ensure that sellers have the flexibility to defer presentation of some terms but that will
also protect purchasers against the unfair imposition of unexpected and important terms arriving at a time
when purchasers are very unlikely to read or act on them. The mechanism he proposes, which he refers to as
Template Notice, is an intermediate form of disclosure that meets the pressing concerns of both buyers and
sellers. It would require sellers to provide the following vital information before or during purchase: a brief
and clear list or summary of terms that the buyer will not see until after purchase, a statement that the buyer
will have the right to reject the terms and avoid the transaction, and a description of how to exercise that right.
Template Notice is a reasonable and workable restriction on the ability of sellers to defer the disclosure of
contract terms. Sellers would still be able to defer terms, but to a more limited extent than is currently
permitted.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have typically either embraced or
rejected rolling contracts. This Article offers a third alternative:
improving the rolling contract.
Courts have failed to develop a satisfactory approach for
determining which contract terms sellers may provide after
purchase—a failure of significance given the proliferation of rolling
contracts. Courts enforcing rolling contracts have given sellers nearly
1
unfettered ability to delay disclosure of contract terms. Buyers now
routinely find important contract terms, such as arbitration
provisions and limitations on damages, inside the box of a newly
purchased item instead of learning about the terms before or during
purchase or order (as would be the case in a traditional contract).
In this Article, I propose a mechanism that will ensure that sellers
continue to have needed flexibility to defer some contract terms, but
that will also protect purchasers against the unfair imposition of
unexpected and important contract terms arriving at a time when
purchasers are very unlikely to read or act on them.
The proposal, which I refer to as “Template Notice,” is an
intermediate form of disclosure that meets the pressing concerns of
both buyers and sellers. It would not require sellers to provide the
full text of all contract terms before or during purchase or order. It
would, however, require sellers to do more than merely give notice
that unspecified additional terms will be forthcoming. Sellers would
be required to provide the following vital information before or
during purchase or order: a brief and clear list or summary of
important terms being deferred (but not the full text), a statement
that the buyer will have the right to reject the terms and avoid the
transaction, and a description of how to exercise that right. For
1. See discussion infra Part I.
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example, a potential purchaser of a computer placing an order over
the telephone might be told by the sales representative that:
Inside the box with your computer there will be some additional
contract terms. Among other things, those terms limit the time
you would have to sue us if there is a problem, limit the damages
you could be awarded, and require binding arbitration of any
disputes between us. Those terms will be in the box and you can
return the computer if they are not acceptable. You can also
obtain them now if you would like through our website, or I will
send them to you.

I choose the term “Template Notice” because the information
provided at purchase or order should establish the overall form or
template of the transaction. It recognizes the primacy of the
purchase to the transaction, while also recognizing that the contract
is not completely closed to new terms at that point. Sellers can and
should be able to defer some terms until after purchase or order, but
only to a more limited extent than is currently permitted. Template
Notice provides an appropriate limitation on the ability of sellers to
defer terms: sellers would have the flexibility to delay terms, but
could do so only for terms that flesh out details of the information
provided at purchase. Terms beyond the structure established at
purchase or order could not be added “out of the blue.”
There are a number of reasons why Template Notice should be
adopted as part of the rolling contract. First, Template Notice
reinforces some of the justifications for enforcing rolling contracts.
Second, Template Notice is fair to both buyers and sellers. Template
Notice is a compromise—one that builds on existing practice and
would be relatively easy to implement. Third, Template Notice would
make assent to deferred terms more meaningful. Fourth, Template
Notice makes sense given the structure and the rhythm of rolling
contracts. Finally, Template Notice helps to clarify the contractual
significance of documents and actions in the post-purchase period of
a transaction.
In addition, Template Notice emerges from an application of the
doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable expectations to the
deferral of terms. As an unfortunate consequence of an approach to
rolling contracts that focuses on the mechanics and timing of
contract formation, these doctrines have largely been sidelined from
the assessment of the unique aspects of rolling contracts. These
doctrines could play a useful role if they were fully applied to the
deferral of terms. That application need not, and in fact should not,
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result in the end of rolling contracts. Instead, it would result in their
improvement.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I provide a brief
overview of the rolling contract. In Part II, I describe how the prepurchase notice requirement articulated in early rolling contract
cases has been reduced to a near nullity. In Part III, I present the
arguments in support of Template Notice. Finally, in Part IV, I
address how unconscionability and reasonable expectations could be
adapted and applied to rolling contracts.
Before proceeding further, a brief note on terminology: Although
2
the term “rolling contract” does not pass without objection, given its
widespread use I will employ that term in this Article. I will describe
as “deferred terms” those terms that are presented after purchase or
order and will use the phrase “deferral of terms” to describe the
practice of presenting some contract terms after purchase or order.
I.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ROLLING CONTRACTS
3

Rolling contracts are contracts formed over time, with the seller
presenting the terms in batches. Some terms are provided before or
during the purchase or order, while others are provided later. These
transactions typically give the buyer a right to return a purchased
4
item or cancel a purchased service to avoid the transaction.
2. Professor Jean Braucher has pointed out that the label “rolling contract” is a
loaded one since it seems to take for granted that terms presented after purchase or
order are part of the contract (a position with which Professor Braucher takes great
issue). She would cast the issue as the enforceability of delayed terms. Jean
Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case Against
Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753, 75758 (2004). Professor Peter Alces suggests that it is more accurate to describe the
judicial acceptance of rolling contracts as giving rise to “checkerboard contract[s],”
contracts that are formed under “a regime that relies on traditional contract doctrine
when it suits and on practical considerations when it does not.” Peter A. Alces, On
Discovering Doctrine: “Justice” in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 497 (2005).
3. We are probably nearly at the point when “rolling contract” no longer needs
to be defined. Rolling contracts have, after all, made their way into the casebooks for
the first-year Contracts course. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS
ON CONTRACTS 116 (4th ed. 2004); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONTRACTS 222 (6th ed. 2001); BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN
LAW OF CONTRACTS 189, 190, 195 (2005); CHARLES L. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT
LAW 255, 259 (5th ed. 2003). The term “rolling contracts” has also apparently won its
skirmish with the once-competing term “layered contracts,” a term previously used by
some courts. See Puget Sound Fin., LLC v. Unisearch, 47 P.3d 940, 944 (Wash. 2002)
(using the term “layered contracts” to refer to a contract where the full terms are
disclosed after purchase); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (same).
The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (“UCITA”) describes these contracts as both “rolling” and
“layered.” UCITA § 202 cmt. 4, 7 U.L.A. pt. II, at 276 (2002).
4. See generally Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744
(2002) (describing the mechanics of rolling contracts).
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Rolling contracts are premised on the idea that the contract forms,
not at purchase or order, but only after the expiration of the “acceptor-return period.” In two highly influential decisions, ProCD, Inc. v.
5
6
Zeidenberg and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals pushed back the time of contract formation to accommodate
deferred terms. In ProCD, the court assessed the enforceability of
license terms included inside a box of software. The buyer argued
that since the contract formed when he bought the software, he was
7
not bound by terms that were only visible after purchase. The court
rejected the premise that the contract had been formed at purchase.
Instead, the court held that the seller had structured the transaction
so that the failure to return the software during the accept-or-return
8
period, and not the purchase, constituted acceptance. Thus, the
court found it unnecessary to consider whether the deferred terms
became part of the contract under the “battle of the forms” provision
9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) since the terms were
10
part of the contract under basic principles of offer and acceptance.
In the court’s view, the return option not only compensated for the
failure to disclose complete terms at the time of purchase, but also
11
served as the very vehicle for enforcing the deferred terms.
According to the court, by enforcing terms presented after
purchase it was doing nothing new or even particularly noteworthy,
and “[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to
return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may
12
be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”
The court did more than merely tolerate the tradeoff of a return
option for disclosure at the time of purchase; it seemed to actually
prefer the return option. After all, the court noted, the deferred
13
terms can be read “in the comfort of home” and “at [the buyer’s]
14
leisure.” The return option gives the buyer a “chance to make a
15
final decision after a detailed review,” presumably in contrast to
forcing a consumer to read through contract terms under the time
pressures inherent in most purchases. Further, the court noted that
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
Id. at 1452-53.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005).
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-53.
Id.
Id. at 1451.
Id.
Id. at 1452.
Id. at 1453.
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full disclosure of all terms at the time of purchase would have
required “microscopic type” or the removal of other more useful
16
information (such as a description of what the software does).
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that courts should treat
standardized terms in shrinkwrap software licenses (an early species
of rolling contract) no differently than standardized terms presented
17
at purchase.
The Seventh Circuit subsequently made clear that its approval of
the deferral of terms was not limited to shrinkwrap licenses and that
sellers in a variety of contexts could substitute such deferral for
18
complete up-front disclosure of terms. In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
the Seventh Circuit enforced an arbitration provision that had not
been mentioned by the sales representative when the computer was
purchased. The seller included the provision inside the box in which
19
the purchased computer was shipped. The seller of the computer
used what the court characterized as the same sort of “accept-or20
return offer” that had been used in ProCD. The court rejected the
plaintiffs’ arguments that the holding in ProCD should be limited to
21
the context of that case. Instead, as in ProCD, the court focused on
the practical difficulties inherent in making full disclosure of all
22
terms at the time of purchase. Additionally, as in ProCD, the court
was satisfied that the contract had not been formed until after the
23
accept-or-return period expired.
The influence of ProCD and Hill has been significant, in large part
because those cases have set the terms of the debate and resulted in a
focus on the timing and mechanics of contract formation. Rolling
contracts are said by courts enforcing them to be premised on the
“proposition that a contract is formed not at the time of purchase or
earlier but rather when the purchaser either rejects by seeking a
24
refund or assents by not doing so within a specified time.”
In
contrast, courts refusing to enforce deferred terms tend to take the
16. Id. at 1451.
17. See id. at 1449 (concluding that shrinkwrap licenses “are enforceable unless
their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general” such as
unconscionability).
18. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
19. See id. at 1148 (describing the transaction at issue).
20. Id. at 1149.
21. Id. at 1149-50.
22. See id. at 1149 (discussing impracticability of cashiers or sales representatives
reading several pages of legal documents to potential customers).
23. Id. at 1148-49.
24. Higgs v. Auto. Warranty Corp. of Am., 134 Fed. App’x 828, 831 (6th Cir.
2005) (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 431 n.43 (2d Cir.
2004)).
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position that the contract was formed at purchase or order. As the
Oklahoma Supreme Court recently noted, whether a court enforces
deferred terms is often based on that “court’s determination of when
26
the contract was formed.”
Additionally, as noted, both the ProCD and Hill opinions focused
on the difficulties inherent in requiring sellers to make complete
disclosure of all terms at purchase or order. Neither opinion
contemplated the possibility of requiring something less than
complete disclosure. These cases set up something of a false choice
between the extremes of either requiring complete disclosure of the
full text of all terms at purchase or requiring no disclosure of the
substance of deferred terms. The possibility of an intermediate
approach, such as Template Notice, apparently was not considered.
II. DIMINUTION OF NOTICE AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
ROLLING CONTRACT
A. Pre-Purchase Notice in Early Rolling Contract Jurisprudence
The court in ProCD seemed to counsel that notice is a component
of a proper rolling contract, observing that “[n]otice on the outside,
terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if
the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business
27
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.” However, the notice element
in ProCD did not evolve into the type of notice I propose in this
Article. Instead, in relatively short order, notice was reduced nearly
to the vanishing point. This development has been made possible, I
think, by the fact that the usual doctrines that might police the
deferral of terms, such as unconscionability, have largely been absent
28
from the discussion.
Although ProCD indicated that a buyer should have notice that
additional terms will be forthcoming, the court did not appear to
contemplate a particularly robust notice requirement. The district
court in ProCD described the “sole reference” to the license

25. See, e.g., Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765
(D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that contract was formed when seller agreed to ship the
goods or, at the latest, when the goods were actually shipped).
26. Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 127 P.3d 560, 566 (Okla. 2005); see also I.Lan
Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002)
(observing that the difference in the outcome of cases depends on when courts
determine the contract was formed).
27. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2 (reviewing the reluctance of courts to apply
the doctrine of unconscionability to rolling contracts).
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agreement that would have been visible before purchase of the
software as a “disclosure in small print at the bottom of the package,
stating that defendants were subject to the terms and conditions of
29
the enclosed license agreement.”
For the Seventh Circuit, that
30
reference was sufficient notice. Given the particular facts of ProCD,
that decision is understandable. The purchase in ProCD was of a
database containing information from thousands of telephone
directories and the provision at issue was a restriction on making
31
commercial use of the database.
A reasonable consumer
32
(particularly one as sophisticated as the defendant in ProCD) with
knowledge that the purchase was subject to a license agreement
would likely expect the license to include such a term. The court’s
reluctance to set a high notice standard may simply have been an
unfortunate consequence of the fact that the particular provision at
issue in ProCD was of a type that the buyer should have
33
contemplated.
Instead, the court indicated that any term not
requiring special notice (such as a warranty disclaimer that must be
34
conspicuous) was “covered” by the general notice of a license
35
agreement.
The Seventh Circuit subsequently further delineated the role of
notice in rolling contracts. In Hill, the court found sufficient notice
of a deferred arbitration clause based on some advertisements that
vaguely referenced terms completely unrelated to the arbitration
36
clause. The arbitration clause was included in the packaging of a
37
computer that had been ordered over the phone. The court held
that the buyers had notice at the time of the order that there would
38
be additional terms. This conclusion was based on a rather slender
reed.
According to the court, the computer manufacturer’s
advertisements stated “that their products come with limited
warranties and lifetime support” (although the advertisements
29. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 654 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
30. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453.
31. Id. at 1449.
32. The defendant formed and ran a corporation to resell the information from
the database he purchased. Id. at 1450.
33. Additionally, the plaintiff-purchaser’s actions in making commercial use of
the database hardly made him sympathetic to the court. See James J. White,
Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 723, 741 (2004) (noting that the
ultimate outcome in ProCD was probably justified since “Zeidenberg was surely a
naughty fellow who deserved to have his hands slapped”).
34. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2005).
35. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453.
36. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
37. See id. at 1148 (describing the circumstances of the computer purchase).
38. Id. at 1150.
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39

presumably mentioned nothing about arbitration). For the Seventh
Circuit, the knowledge of the limited warranty and lifetime technical
support imparted by these advertisements presumably triggered, or
should have triggered, a number of questions in the minds of the
purchasers: “How limited was the warranty—30 days, with service
contingent on shipping the computer back, or five years, with free
40
onsite service? What sort of support was offered?”
The court indicated that if the buyers had really been interested in
finding the additional terms before purchase, they could have done
so. The court stressed that the buyers could have asked the seller to
41
“send a copy.” However, the court failed to specify a copy of what.
42
As the court observed, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the
43
buyers could have requested a copy of the warranty.
But that
warranty would not have included the arbitration clause at issue in
Hill. The court’s solution—that the computer manufacturer would
not have refused to send the complete terms—is a bit
underwhelming since the buyers were not aware that there were any
44
other contract terms to request.
Additionally, the court noted that the buyers could have taken it on
themselves to “consult public sources,” such as computer magazines
45
and websites, to search out complete terms of the contract. As with
the alternative of requesting the terms from the manufacturer, a
potential buyer would really have no idea what types of terms to look
for or whether it was worth his or her time to make the effort in the
first place. Further, locating the correct magazine or finding the
46
correct terms on a website is often no easy feat.
Whatever one might say about the significance of the notice of
deferred terms in both ProCD and Hill, at least the notice was
provided before the purchase was complete in both those cases. In
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2004).
43. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
44. The advertisement of “lifetime support” referred to by the court does not
signal additional terms. Instead, most buyers would probably perceive the statement
as promising technical support over the phone or Internet and would not suspect
that any contract term would be needed to flesh out the promise. At any rate, the
statement would be more likely to reassure than raise concerns.
45. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
46. There is also the problem that sellers typically reserve the right to change the
terms at any time without notice, so there is no assurance that whatever terms a
potential buyer finds will be the ones ultimately applicable to the buyer’s transaction.
See Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (Civ. Ct. 2001) (noting that these
changes can happen before a purchaser has a meaningful chance to review the
terms).
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fact, both opinions stressed the importance of such notice being
provided before purchase. The court in Hill noted while explaining
its reasoning in ProCD that: “Consumers browsing the aisles of a store
can look at the box, and if they are unwilling to deal with the
prospect of additional terms can leave the box alone, avoiding the
transaction costs of returning the package after reviewing its
47
contents.” This choice of whether to avoid the contract completely
can only be made if notice of deferred terms is provided at or before
purchase. Similarly, the court in ProCD noted that one of the terms
the buyer agreed to “by purchasing the software [was] that the
48
transaction was subject to a license.” Notice of such license thus had
to have been provided before the purchase was complete.
Although the notice in ProCD and Hill may have been weak, at least
it came before purchase or order. As I discuss in the next Section,
subsequent cases have further reduced the role of notice in rolling
contracts.
B. Reduction of the Role of Notice in Rolling Contracts
Courts assessing rolling contracts subsequent to ProCD and Hill
rendered the notice requirement even less substantial by largely
ignoring the rationale of ProCD and Hill as it relates to the
importance of pre-purchase notice. Such courts have been satisfied
even if notice of deferred terms is provided after purchase. For
49
instance, in Schafer v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., the plaintiff
purchased cellular phone service over the telephone. The plaintiff
challenged the validity of an arbitration clause that was contained
inside a “Welcome Guide,” alleging that she had never received the
50
Welcome Guide. The court was unconcerned with the plaintiff’s
claim that she had not received the Welcome Guide because, whether
or not the plaintiff received the Welcome Guide, she had notice of
51
it. This notice was provided by a statement on the box in which the
phone was shipped after the customer had already ordered the
52
phone service.
While that notice was received before contract
53
formation (at least as formation was viewed by the Schafer court),
pre-formation notice, as opposed to pre-purchase notice, does not
serve the concerns outlined in ProCD and Hill. Indeed, despite the
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
No. Civ. 04-4149-JLF, 2005 WL 850459 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2005).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3-5.
Id. at *5.
See id. (noting that acceptance occurred by use of the telephone service).
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54

Schafer court’s heavy reliance on Hill, Hill actually makes quite
explicit that the language on a shipping box provided after purchase
55
is irrelevant to the question of notice.
Schafer is not the only court to disregard the rationale for prepurchase notice. The Washington Supreme Court in M.A. Mortenson
56
Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp. ignored it as well. Mortenson
involved the enforceability of a limitation on consequential damages
that was included in a shrinkwrap license accompanying purchased
57
software. The term was provided with the purchased software along
with a provision giving the buyer the right to return the product for a
58
refund if the terms were not acceptable. The court referenced the
59
“notice on the outside” language of ProCD, but seemed to ignore any
requirement of pre-purchase notice. Instead, the court found that
there had been sufficient notice of the license terms since the terms
were in the shrinkwrap package, the manual, and the software
60
protection devices. Additionally, the license was mentioned on the
61
first screen each time the consumer used the software. But the
problem with this analysis is the same as in Schafer: although the
terms were provided before the point at which the contract was (in
62
the court’s view) formed, neither the terms nor any notice of them
were presented before purchase.
While cases like Mortenson and Schafer represent an inappropriate
step away from the pre-purchase notice contemplated in Hill and
ProCD, at least they acknowledge the notice component of a rolling
contract. Other courts do not even mention the need for any notice,
pre-purchase or otherwise, and instead focus only on the buyer’s
63
ability to return the product or cancel the service for a refund.
54. See id. at *4-5.
55. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (observing
that lack of notice of terms on a shipping box was immaterial since such notice
would not have been seen before purchase).
56. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
57. Id. at 307.
58. Id. at 308.
59. Id. at 312-13.
60. Id. at 313.
61. Id.
62. See id. (stating that the buyer’s “use of the software constituted assent to the
agreement”).
63. See, e.g., Westendorf v. Gateway, 2000 Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 16, 2000) (following rationale of Hill without mention of whether buyer
had notice that additional terms would be involved in transaction); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (same); see also O’Quin v.
Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003) (determining, without
discussion of whether buyer had notice of additional terms before signing contract,
that the arbitration agreement in a cellular telephone service plan was enforceable
even though it was provided after service contract was signed); Lozano v. AT&T
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C. Insignificant Consequences for Failure to Provide Notice
The notice aspect of rolling contracts is further weakened by the
apparent lack of any significant consequences to a seller for failure to
provide notice. The court in Hill raised, but did not fully address,
what would happen if a seller were to attempt to disclose a term after
purchase without any pre-purchase notice that the transaction would
involve deferred terms: “Perhaps the [purchasers] would have had a
better argument if they were first alerted to [the existence of
deferred terms] after opening the box and wanted to return the
computer to avoid the disagreeable terms but were dissuaded by the
64
expense of shipping.”
The court had no reason to fully meet the issue (since the Hills had
the notice required by the court), but the court’s language indicates
a high burden for a buyer seeking to argue that the seller should be
penalized for not providing notice. The buyer would apparently have
to establish that he read the term at issue, found the term
disagreeable, and would have returned the good but for the shipping
costs—a burden of proof that would severely limit the number of
claims that could successfully be made.
Nor is it clear what remedy awaits a buyer who could meet this high
burden. One might expect that the remedy would be nonenforcement of the term—the result that would flow from a finding
65
of unconscionability or from a finding that a term was beyond the
66
reasonable expectations of the buyer. However, the court’s dictum
on this point indicates that the potential consequence to the seller
would be minuscule: “What [would] the remedy be [if the buyer had
no notice of the existence of additional terms until after purchase]—
67
could it exceed the shipping charges?” The question is, for the
68
court, “interesting,” but is not addressed any further.
In the balance of this Article, I explain why and how the notice
aspect of rolling contracts should be restored and enhanced through
Template Notice.
III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TEMPLATE NOTICE
In this Part of the Article, I provide a number of arguments in favor
of Template Notice. In Section A, I argue that Template Notice
Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (similar).
64. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
65. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2005).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
67. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
68. Id.
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enhances some of the justifications for enforcing rolling contracts. In
Section B, I argue that Template Notice is fair to both buyers and
sellers. I argue as well that Template Notice builds on existing
practice and would be relatively easy to implement. In Section C, I
argue that Template Notice would make assent to deferred
standardized terms more meaningful. In Section D, I discuss how
Template Notice makes sense given the structure and rhythm of
rolling contracts. Finally, in Section E, I argue that Template Notice
would help resolve the ambiguity over the contractual significance of
post-purchase actions and documents that is inherent in rolling
contracts.
A. Template Notice Reinforces the Justifications for Rolling Contracts
Perhaps the most straightforward argument in support of Template
Notice is that it takes seriously two justifications in support of rolling
contracts: first, that a buyer concerned about contract terms can opt
to seek them out before purchase, and second, that a buyer unwilling
to proceed with a transaction involving deferred terms can opt not to
enter into the transaction in the first place. Template Notice
reinforces both of these justifications.
Enforcement of rolling contracts has often been justified by the
fact that if buyers are really interested in the terms, they can obtain
them before purchase. In Hill, for example, the court’s decision to
enforce an arbitration provision seemed premised largely on the idea
that if the buyers had been interested in the full text of the deferred
terms, the buyers could have and would have obtained them before
buying their computers. The court in Hill noted that the buyers had
three choices in this regard: (1) request the terms from the seller,
(2) find them in magazines or on websites, or (3) wait and read them
69
when the terms arrive with the computer.
The buyers in Hill
knowingly passed up the opportunity to find the terms in advance of
purchase and that decision seemed to justify, at least in part, the
70
court’s decision to enforce those terms.
71
Similarly, in Crawford v. Talk America, Inc., the court enforced an
arbitration provision that had not been provided or described at the
72
time that phone service was ordered.
At the conclusion of the
telephone conversation in which plaintiff ordered the telephone
service, a third party verifier informed her that “[f]or complete
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
No. 05-CV-0180-DRH, 2005 WL 2465909 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2005).
Id. at *2-5.
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information about [her] services,” the purchaser could go on-line or
73
call the company’s toll free number. The purchaser also received a
notice after completing her order informing her that she could
review full contract terms on-line or call or write the service provider
74
if she had a question. Despite the fact that the purchaser never
received a hard copy of the terms, the court still enforced the
75
arbitration provision. The court’s holding was motivated in part by
the fact that the buyer knew there were additional terms and could
76
have sought them out.
Because courts enforce deferred terms when a buyer could have
found them before purchase, it seems reasonable to at least let the
buyer know what to look for if the buyer chooses to try to find these
terms. That is, basic fairness dictates that if courts are going to
attribute to buyers any knowledge that they could have obtained by
some effort, then buyers ought to at least have a hint as to what that
knowledge involves. This is a function that Template Notice would
serve well.
Perhaps more importantly, Template Notice gives the buyer the
information needed to decide whether the types of terms at issue are
important enough for the buyer to make the effort to seek out the
details in the first place (especially since seeking out the terms
requires more than simply looking through a single document). In
other words, the computer purchasers in Hill might have deemed the
exact details of the “limited warranty” or the “lifetime support”
insufficiently important to research further.
However, if the
purchasers had known that there were terms that affected their right
to sue in court, they may have thought it worthwhile to search out the
details of such terms.
Hill is also premised on the notion that a buyer unwilling to
proceed with a transaction that involves deferred terms can simply
refrain from making the purchase in the first place. The court in Hill
observed that consumers “browsing the aisles of a store can look at
the box, and if they are unwilling to deal with the prospect of
additional terms can leave the box alone, avoiding the transactions

73. Id. at *3.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *4-5; cf. Schlessinger v. Holland Am., N.V., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 11 (Ct.
App. 2004) (observing that even though passenger had not received her ticket with
the relevant forum selection provision until after she had made payment for the
ticket, she had “ample opportunity” to learn of the terms either through the cruise
line’s website or from her travel agent).
76. Crawford, 2005 WL 2465909, at *4.
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costs of returning the package after reviewing its contents.” The
purchase thus serves as something of a threshold through which the
buyer can decide whether or not to enter the transaction. However,
this threshold function can only be served if potential buyers have
notice of the existence of additional terms before purchase.
Furthermore, this function can be much better served by requiring
sellers to provide potential buyers with some indication of what these
deferred terms will be, rather than merely requiring notice that there
will be some unspecified deferred terms. The additional information
provided by Template Notice would enable buyers to make betterinformed decisions about whether or not to proceed with a
transaction.
B. Template Notice is Fair to Both Buyers and Sellers
Because it addresses many of the concerns of those who oppose any
deferral of terms, as well as the concerns of those who oppose
requiring complete pre-purchase disclosure of contract terms,
Template Notice represents a sensible middle ground that is fair to
both buyers and sellers. Further, it builds on existing practice and
would be relatively easy to implement.
1.

Concerns that deferral of terms is unfair to buyers
A number of factors may negatively impact the likelihood that
deferred terms will be read or acted on. These factors lead some
commentators to describe rolling contracts as an “extreme version of
78
an adhesion contract.”
By the time a buyer actually sees the full terms, the buyer is already
committed, both financially and psychologically, to the transaction.
Professor Jean Braucher has compared the rolling contract, at least in
some contexts, to the “bait and switch” sales tactic: both take
advantage of the consumer’s investment of time and energy in a
79
given transaction before the consumer is provided full information.
Professor Braucher has also noted that while it is certainly possible
that only a small percentage of buyers read terms presented before

77. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
78. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 233, 249 (2002).
79. Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1853 (2000); cf. Jane M. Rolling, The UCC
Under Wraps: Exposing the Need for More Notice to Consumers of Computer Software with
Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COM. L.J. 197, 226 (1999) (providing reasons why, as a
practical matter, the option to return for a full refund may be “cost-prohibitive and
unattainable”).
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purchase, the phenomenon of “cognitive dissonance” may well
80
decrease that percentage if terms are presented after purchase.
Cognitive dissonance has been described as a “form of selective
perception in which actors give greater weight to evidence that
confirms beliefs they already hold and lesser weight to contradictory
81
evidence.” Thus, a buyer is unlikely to attend to any evidence that
might demonstrate that he or she had made a mistake that needs to
be corrected. This would be especially so after the buyer has already
paid for and taken delivery of a product or begun receiving a
82
service.
In addition, Professor, now judge, Robert Keeton noted that a
lapse of time between payment and receipt of terms may decrease the
83
likelihood that deferred terms will be read.
Professor Keeton
observed, in discussing the making of insurance agreements, that:
the normal processes for marketing most kinds of insurance do not
ordinarily place the detailed policy terms in the hands of the
policyholder until the contract has already been made. In life
insurance marketing, for example, the policyholder does not
ordinarily see the policy terms until he has signed the application
(his offer to contract with the company) and has paid a premium,
and the company has approved the application and has executed
and issued the policy. This often means a delay of weeks, and
occasionally even longer, between making an application and
having possession of the policy—a factor enhancing the
policyholder’s disinclination to read his policy carefully or even to
84
read it at all.

This description applies neatly to rolling contracts as well.
A phenomenon referred to as the “endowment effect” may also
work to reduce the likelihood that the buyer will read the deferred
terms. The endowment effect “stands for the principle that people
tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do
85
not.”

80. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 765-66 (observing that after a consumer has
paid for and taken delivery of a good, the effects of cognitive dissonance would likely
be quite strong).
81. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 n.163
(2000) (citing LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)).
82. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 765-66.
83. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970).
84. Id.
85. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1228 (2003).
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Research in the field of marketing by Professor Stacy Wood
provides some evidence that the endowment effect may reduce the
likelihood that deferred terms in a rolling contract will be read.
Professor Wood conducted a number of experiments to assess the
effect of return policies in the context of “remote sales”—sales in
which the buyer shops through the Internet, catalogs, or television
86
home shopping networks. Consumers are likely to regard remote
sales, which involve a time lag between order and receipt of goods, as
a “two-stage process involving separate order and keep-or-return
87
decisions.”
Analysis of decision-making in remote sales is thus
relevant to rolling contracts since many rolling contracts meet the
definition of remote sales. Even rolling contracts made in an on-site
retail environment have the same fundamental structure of a twostage process: first, a decision to purchase, and second, a decision to
“keep-or-return.”
Professor Wood’s experiments demonstrate that the endowment
effect reduces the amount of deliberation that occurs in the “keep-orreturn” decision in remote sales. These experiments compared the
deliberation time between purchases with lenient return policies and
those with more stringent return policies. The experiments revealed
that a lenient return policy reduces the amount of deliberation time
a buyer gives to a purchase at the time of order since the buyer knows
that it will be easy to return the purchased item if the buyer is
88
dissatisfied. One would expect a corresponding increase in postpurchase deliberation time after the product is received. However,
89
no such increase materialized in Professor Wood’s experiments.
Professor Wood attributes this relative overall decrease in
deliberation time to the endowment effect resulting from feelings of
90
ownership in the ordered good —feelings that may even arise at the
91
time of order, before actual ownership or physical possession. Thus,
Professor Wood notes that in this two-stage process, “the consumers
who cavalierly order a product because they know it is easily returned
may fail to give sufficient deliberation to the decision to keep or
return the product because of a sense of ownership and perceived

86. Stacy L. Wood, Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence of Return Policy
Leniency on Two-Stage Decision Processes, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 157, 157 (May 2001).
87. Id. at 159.
88. Id. at 167.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 158.
91. Id. (citing Sankar Sen & Eric Johnson, Mere-Possession Effects without Possession
in Consumer Choice, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 24, 105-18 (1997)).
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92

value.”
Although Professor Wood addresses post-purchase
deliberation over the good itself as opposed to deliberation over
contract terms, it seems plausible that the same ownership effects she
identifies would also decrease the time spent considering the contract
93
terms provided after purchase or order.
Template Notice responds to these concerns, at least partially, by
moving the substance of deferred terms to a point before any
investment in the purchased item or service occurs and before any
feelings of ownership arise.
I should note that although there are arguably valid concerns that
deferral decreases the likelihood that terms will be read or acted on,
not everyone shares this opinion. For instance, Professor Robert
Hillman has argued that deferral has no impact (or, possibly, even
94
has a positive impact) on the likelihood that terms will be read. For
Professor Hillman, because consumers are unlikely to read
standardized terms “under any circumstances, the particular time at
which they could have read them should not control their legal
95
treatment.” Although Professor Hillman doubts that many buyers
96
read standard term contracts regardless of when they are presented,
he indicates that deferral of terms may actually be preferable to
disclosure before purchase or order: “A good argument can be made
that, if anything, the opportunity to read the terms at home creates
more of a reason to enforce standard terms in the rolling contract
97
context.”
Unfortunately this debate has largely been academic. For the most
part, courts have been unwilling to address the impact of deferral in a
98
nuanced way. For instance, in Bischoff v. DirectTV, Inc., the court
rejected an invitation to consider the impact of a lapse of time
between the initiation of purchased television service and the
99
presentation of contract terms. Plaintiffs in Bischoff argued that such
92. Id.
93. Cf. Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a
Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 72426 (2004) (observing that deferral of terms takes advantage of a buyer’s
unwillingness to give up something the buyer already owns, thus forcing the buyer
“to admit being tricked as to the deal’s real value, [and this] when coupled with the
other cognitive defects, the inconveniences connected with return, and the cost of
search for a replacement” make it very unlikely a buyer will ever read deferred
terms).
94. Hillman, supra note 4, at 752-58.
95. Id. at 757.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
99. Id. at 1105.
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a lapse was a basis for distinguishing Hill, because in Hill the terms
accompanied the purchased computers and thus were available at the
100
same time the buyers took possession of the computers. Instead of
addressing the issue directly, the court focused on the “economic and
practical considerations involved in selling services to mass
consumers which make it acceptable for terms and conditions to
101
follow the initial transaction.”
The court thus missed an
opportunity to assess whether the endowment effect or other factors
might make such a lapse of time significant. Other courts have also
been unwilling to consider the impact that the deferral of terms may
102
have on the likelihood that terms will be read or acted on.
It is difficult to know for certain whether the deferral of terms
decreases the likelihood that the buyer will in fact read or act on the
terms. There is a reasonable argument that it does, and so Template
Notice partially meets these concerns by pushing at least some
additional disclosure to a time in the transaction when it is more
likely to be noticed and when a buyer’s decision to proceed with the
transaction is less encumbered by sunk time and costs. Even if
deferral does not reduce the likelihood that terms will be read,
Template Notice would still have the salutary effect of giving the
buyer two opportunities to become aware of the deferred terms.
2.

Concerns that requiring pre-purchase disclosure is unfair to sellers
The previous subsection focused on concerns over the deferral of
terms and fairness to buyers. This Subsection, in contrast, focuses on
concerns that requiring full disclosure of all terms before or during
purchase would be unfair and unduly burdensome to sellers.
Whatever fault one might find with the reasoning in ProCD and
Hill, it is difficult to dismiss entirely Judge Easterbrook’s observation
that a seller required to place the entire agreement on a product’s
packaging would have to use “microscopic type” or remove other,
103
more useful information, such as what the purchased item does.
Similarly, there is also force in the court’s statement in Hill that:
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers
before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone
for direct-sales operations . . . had to read the four-page statement
of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing courts’ reluctance to seriously
evaluate the charge of procedural unconscionability in the context of deferred terms
and rolling contracts).
103. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-51 (7th Cir. 1997).
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voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential
buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their
104
time.

Template Notice does not entail complete disclosure of all terms.
It would not require microscopic text or a lengthy reading of terms.
It would instead require only summary notice of the most important
terms.
Template Notice also addresses concerns that complete prepurchase disclosure would overwhelm the buyer. As Professor
Hillman observes, “by increasing the information available to
consumers, the early display of terms may add to the problem of
105
information overload.”
Professor Hillman’s concern is that the
likelihood of reading may in fact go down if we require sellers to
106
disclose all information at once. Template Notice responds to this
concern by calling for selective, but not fully comprehensive, early
disclosure.
3.

Template notice as an easy to implement extension of current practice
Template Notice is not an academic theory divorced from reality.
A similar approach is already being implemented in the context of
transactions contained within a single document. It is not unusual
for courts assessing standardized contracts contained in a single
document to give weight to notice provisions that the seller placed at
the beginning or on the front of an agreement. For instance, in
107
Lucido v. Dolphin Cruise Lines, Inc., the court enforced a provision
108
that limited a cruise passenger’s time to sue to one year. The court
found that the passenger’s ticket “reasonably communicated” the
provision because there was a clear warning on the face of the multi-

104. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
105. Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of EStandard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 850 (2005); cf. Paul Steinberg &
Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 105, 302 (2004) (“Information disclosure may be used in perverse ways. First, by
means of ‘information overload’—the likelihood of a legal document being read in
its entirety by a franchisee is inversely proportional to the length and complexity of
the document”).
106. See Hillman, supra note 105, at 849-50 (describing reasons why required
disclosures may be ineffective or counterproductive). An official comment to
Section 211 of the Restatement makes a similar point to bolster its regime of general
enforcement of standardized terms, noting that such enforcement frees sellers and
consumers “from attention to numberless variations and [enables buyers to] focus on
meaningful choice among a limited number of significant features: transaction type,
style, quantity, price, or the like.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a
(1981).
107. No. Civ. A. 95-2560, 1996 WL 15734 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
108. Id. at *3-5.
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page ticket that pointed out and summarized the term at issue,
stating that: “Attention is particularly drawn to . . . Articles 19 and 20
which limit the periods in which notification of claim is to be made
and suit commenced. Failure to comply with those limitation periods
109
will result in the loss of your rights.”
The language thus drew
110
Other
“special attention to the time limit and its consequences.”
courts have also found contract provisions were meaningfully
communicated, at least in part, by virtue of a special reference to
111
them on the face of or near the beginning of a contract.
The point of purchase is the contextual analogue to the face of a
document or the space near the signature line—it is the point at
which attention is most closely being paid to the transaction by the
potential purchaser. It is thus the appropriate time for Template
Notice to be given. As I noted earlier in the Article, it would not be
112
difficult for a telephone sales representative to provide this notice
113
or for a seller to place such notice on product packaging.
Template Notice would impose a minimal burden on sellers. A
seller would not be required to highlight all the deferred terms, only
the important ones. The universe of terms, the enforceability of
which sellers are truly concerned with, is probably not very large,
consisting of such provisions as arbitration provisions and limitations
on damages, warranties, or the time within which suit may be
114
brought.
It might also first appear that requiring some description of the
terms is more of a burden than simply requiring notice that an
additional form is coming. Professor Randy Barnett notes that in the
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id. at *3.
111. See, e.g., Lowe v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(explaining that the front of a ticket provided notice that the terms should be read
carefully along with a statement that the “passengers [sic] attention is further
directed to Clause 5 which sets forth limitation periods in which notification of claim
is to be made and suit commenced”); Tateoasian v. Celebrity Cruise Servs., Ltd., 768
A.2d 1248, 1251-52 (R.I. 2001) (stating that the notice clearly set forth that the
contract provisions included limits on time in which suit may be brought).
112. For some suggested language that the sales representative could read, see
supra pp. 102-03.
113. There would, to be sure, be situations where Template Notice is not
practicable. In such situations, the result need not be automatic non-enforcement
but could instead be a heightened scrutiny of the substance of the term. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.
114. I do not advocate in this Article for a particular “test” to be used to determine
which terms should be disclosed through Template Notice and which should not,
though an appropriate standard might be that notice must be given of any type of
term that, if fully explained, would be of interest to a reasonable buyer at purchase.
As a practical matter, the number of terms would be relatively small. The matter may
best be left to evolving commercial practice and judicial determinations.
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latter case, all that would be necessary is for a telephone
115
representative to tell a buyer that “the form will follow in the box.”
Professor Clayton Gillette, however, has raised some concern that
merely notifying a buyer that additional terms will be on the way will
116
more likely give rise to “buyer agitation than buyer enlightenment.”
Professor Gillette conceives of a conversation after a telephone sales
representative informs a buyer that there will be additional terms
included with the ordered item when it arrives going something
along the following lines:
“Customer: What terms? What are they?
Operator: They will be included in the box.
117
Customer: Well, wait a minute, can’t you tell me what they are?”

Professor Gillette argues that at this point the representative will
have the choice of either “dron[ing] through pages of terms” or
118
simply restating that the terms will be included.
The option I
propose—notification of additional terms with some description of
key provisions—is a third alternative. The “extra” information
provided anticipates the inquisitive buyer Professor Gillette imagines,
providing select information without inundating the buyer or putting
an excessive burden on the seller.
C. Standardized Terms, Blanket Assent, and Rolling Contracts
Assent to deferred standardized terms would be more meaningful
with Template Notice. Template Notice corrects for the fact that
deferred terms are separated both physically and chronologically
from the key terms of the deal and from the moment of purchase.
Some preliminary discussion of assent to standardized terms in
general may prove helpful. A logical place to start any such
discussion is with Karl Llewellyn’s influential statement on the topic:
Instead of thinking about ‘assent’ to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at
all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one
thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may

115. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 643
(2002).
116. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
679, 687 (2004).
117. Id. at 687 n.30.
118. Id.
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have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
119
meaning of the dickered terms.

Llewellyn’s scholarly work has been “enormously influential with
120
courts and commentators” and his conception of blanket assent
“dominates contemporary judicial treatment of standard-form
121
provisions.”
However, blanket assent should not cover quite so much in rolling
contracts as it does in other types of standardized contracts. In a
typical standardized contract of the type presumably envisioned by
Llewellyn, we might be comfortable concluding that a buyer signing a
document is giving blanket assent to standardized terms because the
buyer has the ability to easily see the scope of the terms to which
assent is being given. A buyer with a document in hand has an
immediate ability to read it, and to the extent the buyer foregoes that
opportunity, it may be appropriate to consider the buyer as having
assented to unread terms in that document. Similarly, a buyer with a
document in hand can see how many standardized terms are in front
of him or her (two paragraphs? fifteen pages?) and can at least get a
sense of the scope of that to which he or she is giving assent.
Additionally, a buyer has the option to generally skim through the
document, and to look at the headings or for any conspicuous text.
In such a situation, a mere check that the terms are not
122
“unreasonable or indecent” may be enough.
In a rolling contract, although the buyer has the ability to obtain
the terms before purchase, he or she can only do so with some effort
(such as contacting the manufacturer or searching the Internet).
Similarly, the universe of terms is not so readily evident at the time of
purchase since a buyer has little sense of the extent of standardized
terms involved. Template Notice addresses the differences between
more traditional standardized contracts and rolling contracts. By
requiring notice of the subject matter of deferred terms at purchase,
a buyer is given some opportunity, albeit imperfect, to understand
what he or she is getting into. Template Notice makes up for the
imposition of barriers of time and effort between the buyer and the
123
standardized terms in rolling contracts.
119. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960).
120. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1174, 1206 (1983).
121. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 461 (2002) (describing Llewllyn’s theory of
“blanket assent” and recognizing its importance in modern jurisprudence).
122. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 119, at 370.
123. One scholar has noted that there may be differences in the way in which
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Professor Barnett argues that to the extent buyers would be
surprised to learn of additional terms, requiring sellers to notify
buyers that additional terms will follow the purchase or order is
“more likely to lead to manifestations of assent that reflect the
subjective assent of the parties than a contrary rule requiring no
124
disclosure.” As he explains, unsophisticated buyers may be unlikely
to know that sellers are permitted to provide terms after purchase
“and for this reason are unlikely even to ask whether such will
125
occur.” Accordingly, providing disclosure that additional terms are
coming may serve to make the decision to proceed with a purchase
126
mesh more closely with actual assent to such deferred terms.
But why stop at merely requiring disclosure that some unspecified
terms are coming? If the goal is to make it more likely that the buyer
really means to assent to terms the buyer may not read, it seems
prudent to also let the buyer know what types of terms are at issue.
Such a rule would help secure more meaningful assent. For example,
a party who knows that the agreement contains a “dispute resolution
clause” and does not make an effort to seek out such a term before
purchase can probably more appropriately be deemed to have
assented to a reasonable arbitration clause than could a buyer who
only knew that more terms of an unspecified type were forthcoming.
Template Notice thus secures more meaningful assent to
127
standardized deferred terms.
D. Assent and the Rhythm of the Rolling Contract
Courts enforcing rolling contracts locate assent primarily at postpurchase contract formation. But as a practical matter, rolling
contracts are not back-loaded in this way. Most of the real decisionmaking, especially in consumer purchases, likely occurs at purchase
or order. This is not to say that the contract is or should be closed to
all new terms at purchase or order. But given that deferred terms
arrive when the buyer is unlikely to be focused on the transaction,
and given that the act of keeping a good or not canceling a service is
terms presented on paper and terms presented on the Internet are perceived by
potential buyers and that courts should take those differences into account. See Juliet
M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1332
(2005) (comparing the buyer’s ability to see significant terms in a contract when
flipping through a paper document versus scrolling through computer screens).
124. Barnett, supra note 115, at 642.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. A rolling contract “purist” might, at this point, argue that assent occurs only
after the accept-or-return period lapses. I address the question of when assent occurs
in a rolling contract more fully in the next subsection. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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a fairly weak signal of assent, some mechanism is needed to limit the
scope of deferred terms. Given the primacy of the purchase in the
transaction, the information provided at purchase should serve as the
general form or skeleton of the contract—deferred terms may be
added, but only to flesh out the details.
Decisions of courts enforcing rolling contracts are premised on the
idea that nothing of contractual significance, other than the making
of an offer, occurs until the accept-or-return period, and that the
128
heavy lifting of decision-making and assent occurs after purchase.
Given this premise, virtually any term, whether an arbitration clause
129
or a provision that an additional $10,000 is owed, may be included
among the deferred terms since a seller can make any offer it pleases.
The buyer can always simply say “no” by returning the good or
130
canceling the service.
That conception, however, is not realistic
and has been problematic from the start. Even the examples cited by
the ProCD court in support of its contention that transactions in
which the “exchange of money precedes the communication of
detailed terms” involve transactions in which some agreement was
131
formed when the money was paid.
The first example provided by
the court was the purchase of an insurance policy. The court
describes these transactions as ones in which the buyer typically meets
with an insurance agent with whom he or she discusses “the
essentials” (such as premium amount, coverage, and so forth) and
132
Although additional terms are sent later, such a
pays a premium.
policy typically takes effect on the payment of that first premium, as
133
the ProCD court itself notes.
Thus, at the time of purchase and
before receipt of additional terms, “the essentials” are agreed upon
and a contract is in force. Insurance policies are also particularly bad
proof of the propriety of a relatively unfettered right to add more
terms since such policies are frequently subject to policing under the
doctrine of reasonable expectations to prevent the imposition of
134
unexpected terms.

128. See discussion supra Part I.
129. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that upon opening a package and finding a term that demands payment of another
$10,000, a buyer can avoid forming a contract by simply returning the package).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1451.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the reasonable expectations doctrine and its
application to insurance contracts).
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The second example in ProCD, the purchase of an airplane ticket,
also indicates that the buyer’s decision-making is heavily front-loaded.
The court describes a purchaser calling an airline or travel agent,
getting a price, reserving a seat, and making a payment. The court
noted that there will likely be additional terms on the ticket when it
arrives and that the use of the ticket constitutes acceptance of those
terms. According to Judge Easterbrook, the buyer may reject the
136
terms “by canceling the reservation.”
As with the purchase of an
insurance policy, the purchase of the airline ticket is front-loaded.
Decisions as to price and destination are made at purchase and,
especially in the case of a non-refundable ticket, very little decisionmaking remains to be done afterwards. To say that what happens at
purchase is merely part of the offer stage seems quite unrealistic.
In fact, ProCD itself was ambivalent on when the agreement
occurred in the software sale at issue in that case. Although the court
spoke in terms of acceptance occurring only after the use of the
137
software, earlier in the opinion the court alluded to the possibility
that some agreement was made at the time of purchase, noting that
“one of the terms to which [the buyer] agreed by purchasing software
138
is that the transaction was subject to a license.”
139
And as I have argued more fully in an earlier Article, even if we
accept the argument that in a rolling contract the contract is not
formed until after the accept-or-return period expires, some contract
140
is formed at purchase or order.
Whether or not the contract is
technically consummated at purchase or order, the buyer is most fully
focused on the transaction at that point. To consider which terms
may be deferred without reference to the circumstances of the
purchase, as though the purchase and deferral of terms are
independent of one another, is not appropriate.
It is similarly inappropriate, however, to conclude that a rolling
contract is closed to any new terms and written in stone at the time of
purchase or order. A typical purchaser of an airline ticket, for
example, probably knows that there are terms beyond price and
destination that will be printed on the back of the ticket. Buyers as a
135. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1452.
138. Id. at 1450.
139. Stephen E. Friedman, Text and Circumstance: Warranty Disclaimers in a World of
Rolling Contracts, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 677 (2004).
140. See id. at 726-27 (discussing the possibility that at the time of purchase the
buyer has agreed to at least receive the goods or begin receiving a service and the
seller has agreed to proceed with the sale unless the buyer takes some affirmative
action to prevent such sale).
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class are likely to know that the contract is not truly closed to any new
terms at the point of purchase or order, even if they may not have
had this understanding a few decades ago. As one court noted in
granting summary judgment enforcing deferred contract terms: “if
this case had arisen in 1985 rather than 1997, I might have a different
141
ruling.” And from 1997 to the time of this writing, the prevalence
of deferred terms has certainly only grown.
What then is the rhythm of the rolling contract? Professor Barnett
argues that in rolling contracts the “manifestation of consent has two
142
parts at two different times.”
This conception is far more useful
than a focus on identifying a single moment of contract formation.
But all moments of consent are not created equal. In a rolling
contract we have the problem of matching assents of varying
strengths given at varying times and in varying ways with terms of
143
A consumer’s attention to the purchase is
varying importance.
presumably most often greatest at the time of purchase, and the act
of making the purchase or order is a strong and clear signal of assent.
In contrast, the act of not returning a good or canceling a service
is, to say the least, a bit more ambiguous and can be characterized as
“nominal assent.”
Professor Gillette, while generally favoring
enforcement of deferred terms, notes that to speak of actions such as
opening a box or using a product “in terms of assent is to expand the
meaning of that phrase beyond our normal discourse” since assent
usually requires something “more explicit than opening a box or
using a product that is accompanied (unknown or ignored by the
144
buyer) by a recitation of obligations.”
That what happens after the purchase or order can only
uncomfortably be described as assent is demonstrated by language
145
used by the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., v. Shute, a
case in which the Court assessed the refusal by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to enforce a forum-selection clause on a

141. See M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 310
(Wash. 2000) (quoting statement of the trial court judge in the proceeding below).
142. Barnett, supra note 115, at 641.
143. The time factor thus exacerbates what Professor David Slawson identified,
before the emergence of rolling contracts, as a flaw in Llewellyn’s theory of assent.
See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law
by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 37 (1984) (explaining that Llewellyn’s
conception ignores “the transactional context. It rests on the implicit assumption
that ‘specific assent’ and ‘blanket assent’ are the same and are distributed among
different kinds of terms in the same way regardless of the context of the transaction.
This is certainly not the fact”).
144. Gillette, supra note 116, at 681.
145. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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146

passenger cruise line ticket. Shute, which is one of the cases cited in
ProCD as support for the proposition that payment of money often
147
precedes full disclosure of terms, articulated a test for whether to
enforce choice of forum provisions on passenger cruise line tickets.
Part of that test involves assessing whether the clause is fundamentally
fair. The Court found that the provision at issue was fundamentally
fair since there was no evidence that the cruise line “obtained [the
passengers’] accession to the forum clause by fraud or
148
overreaching.”
Even as the Court approved the forum selection
clause, the Court apparently found itself unable to actually use the
word “agreement” or “assent” to describe the manner in which the
term became binding. Instead, the court settled on “accession.”
That word choice is telling. At some level “accession” is a synonym
for agreement, but the example used by a leading legal dictionary to
illustrate the meaning is instructive: “the family’s accession to the
149
kidnapper’s demands.”
Accession thus carries a connotation of
“reluctantly giving into demands,” as opposed to voluntary and
meaningful assent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has used the word
150
“accession” to carry just that connotation in other contexts as well.
Even if a buyer understands that a return period is available, a
seller’s marketing practices may diminish the buyer’s appreciation
that the return period includes an opportunity to review contract
151
terms. In Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp., the court refused to
enforce an arbitration provision included inside the box of a
152
computer ordered over the telephone.
The court distinguished
ProCD and other cases that enforced terms in rolling contracts
because, although the seller in Defontes did offer a “total satisfaction
[return] policy,” the policy was not sufficiently specific in informing
the buyer that the computer could be returned based on the buyer’s
153
“unwillingness to comply with the terms” included inside the box.
In other words, the buyer might have believed that he had the right
154
to consider and reject the computer, but not the contract terms.
146. Id. at 589.
147. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
148. Shute, 499 U.S. at 595.
149. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 14 (8th ed. 2004).
150. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767 n.12
(1984) (discussing “accession to the demands of the distributors”); see also Haynes v.
State of Wash., 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (describing “accession to police demands”).
151. No. C.A. PC-03-2636, 2004 WL 253560 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2004).
152. Id. at *7.
153. Id.
154. Cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996)
(emphasizing that “acceptance of an offer differs from acceptance of goods after
delivery”).
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Despite the characterization of rolling contracts by courts
enforcing them, the rhythm of the rolling contract is actually that of a
front-loaded transaction in which the most significant decisionmaking with respect to the good or service and its terms occurs at
purchase or order. Given this structure, Template Notice serves a
number of useful purposes: it moves some information to a moment
of focused assent and decision-making and it limits the scope of terms
that will be deemed to have been agreed to through nominal assent.
Perhaps most fundamentally, it uses the information provided at
purchase as the basic structure for the overall contract. As I discuss
later, this approach is already being used in the analogous context of
assessing whether terms may be added pursuant to “change in terms”
155
provisions in credit card agreements.
E. Clarifying Contractual Significance
Ambiguity over the contractual significance of documents and
actions that come after the purchase or order is inherent in rolling
contracts. Template Notice would help resolve that ambiguity by
bridging the separation between the time and manner in which the
key terms of a rolling contract are presented and the time and
manner in which the standardized terms are presented.
The obviousness of the contractual nature of a document is
relevant to the enforceability of standardized terms. For example,
Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that,
with some exceptions, signing or otherwise assenting to a writing
constitutes assent to all the terms contained in the writing, whether
156
or not these terms are read.
Comment d to Section 211 qualifies
that general rule. The comment notes that some documents may
serve both contractual and other non-contractual purposes. When
the party signing a document has reason to understand that such a
document is obviously contractual in nature (the comment gives
warehouse receipts and insurance policies as two examples of
documents whose contractual nature is generally obvious), that party
157
will likely be bound by the contract provisions contained therein.
However, the contractual nature of what might be called “dual use”
documents is less clear. For instance, the comment indicates that

155. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981) (providing that as long
as requirements of the section are met, a party “sign[ing] or otherwise manifest[ing]
assent to a writing . . . adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to
the terms included in the writing”).
157. Id. § 211 cmt. d.
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baggage checks and parking lot tickets may simply appear to be
158
Buyers who lack reason to know of the
identification tokens.
contractual nature of these documents are not bound by terms
159
printed on them.
The comment seems positively prescient in
anticipating rolling contracts when it notes that “[d]ocuments such as
invoices, instructions for use, and the like, delivered after a contract is
160
made, may raise similar problems.”
It seems the drafters of the
Restatement understood that anything coming to a buyer after
purchase is prone to give rise to confusion as to its contractual
nature.
Case law indicates some broadening of the importance of
“contractual significance” in contracts formed in non-traditional
161
ways. In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., the court refused to
162
A web site may
enforce purported contract terms on a web site.
display all types of information, some of which is contractual in
nature and some of which is not. The Second Circuit in Specht used a
test akin to comment d, although it did not make reference to
Section 211 in reaching its decision. Persons downloading the
software at issue in Specht saw on their computers a screen containing
praise for the software and a “Download” button at the bottom of the
screen. To reach the actual license terms at issue, a user would have
to have scrolled down on the screen. The court found that the
license was not binding since a reasonably prudent person
downloading the software would not “have known of the existence of
163
license terms.”
Instead, the plaintiffs’ “apparent manifestation of
consent was to terms contained in a document whose contractual
164
nature was not obvious.”
Although Specht did not involve a rolling contract, many of the
issues it raised are equally relevant to rolling contracts. A key point in
Specht was that it really did not matter how clear the contract terms
were since Internet users had no reason to be on the look-out for
them. While the position of the scroll bar gave some indication that
there may have been more text, that indication was insufficient notice
165
of the contractual nature of such text.
In a rolling contract, the
158. Id.; see also Magliozzi v. P & T Container Serv. Co., Inc., 614 N.E.2d 690, 692
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (indicating that a “trash pickup ticket” was not sufficiently
contractual in nature for term on its reverse side to be binding).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. d.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
162. Id. at 31.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
165. Id. at 31-32.
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clarity of the text of the deferred terms is similarly of no consequence
if a buyer has insufficient reason to suspect that contract terms he or
she can do something about are contained on the pieces of paper
received after purchase.
166
In Campbell v. General Dynamics Government Systems Corp., the court
assessed the enforceability of an arbitration provision that was part of
a new dispute resolution policy an employer had purported to
introduce. The president of the company had sent all employees an
e-mail that, among other things, described the policy. The e-mail
urged employees to review the “enclosed materials”—a reference to
the two hypertext links in the e-mail (one to a brochure describing
167
the policy and one to a handbook containing the full policy).
The court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the arbitration
provision was not enforceable, at least as to the relevant federal claim
168
at issue.
The court concluded after examining the “totality of the
circumstances,” including “the method, content, and context of the
communication,” that the employees were not given minimally
sufficient notice that the new policy was a “contractual instrument,”
the terms of which would be made binding by an employee’s
169
continued employment with the company.
The court noted that
although e-mail was widely used at the company and was a preferred
method of communication in general, it was not ordinarily used by
170
the company for personnel matters or to convey contract terms.
Thus, even though the text of the e-mail announced a new policy, the
receipt of the e-mail did not “raise a red flag vivid enough” to let the
employees anticipate a “legally significant alteration” to employment
171
terms.
The court suggested that requiring employees to
affirmatively respond to the e-mail by clicking a box on the screen
would have helped put employees on notice of the contractual nature
172
of the e-mail and linked documents.
The court also looked to the “content of the communication,”
which consisted of the text of the e-mail and the documents available
by hyperlink. The court focused on the e-mail text, since such a focus
mirrored the way in which the employer had presented the
166. 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005).
167. Id. at 548.
168. Id. at 555. The narrow question was actually whether the company’s
communications had provided employees with sufficient notice such that their claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004), could be
subject to arbitration. Id.
169. Id. at 559.
170. Id. at 556.
171. Id. at 557.
172. Id. at 556-57.
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communication. The text contained a “fundamental flaw”—it “did
not state directly that the Policy contained an arbitration provision
that was meant to effect a waiver of an employee’s right to access a
173
judicial forum.” If anything, the language of the e-mail downplayed
174
the significance of the policy terms and their binding nature.
While explicitness was not absolutely required, it “would have gone a
175
long way toward meeting the employer’s burden.”
An analogy can be made between the e-mail in Campbell and the
purchase phase of a rolling contract. Both serve to frame the
transaction and both serve, in essence, as the gateway to the
remainder of the contract. Both can either highlight or downplay
the contractual significance of what is to come. Just as the e-mail in
Campbell differed significantly in format from the material in the
hypertext link, the pre-purchase disclosure in a rolling contract
differs in format from the manner in which deferred terms are
presented. The fundamental flaw in Campbell of failing to include
notice of the arbitration provision in the text of the e-mail is
replicated by a failure to include a similar notice at purchase in a
rolling contract.
Although neither Specht nor Campbell involved rolling contracts,
one court has applied the rationale of those cases to a rolling
176
contract. In Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp.,
a case already
177
discussed, the court refused to enforce an arbitration provision that
had been included inside the box of a computer ordered over the
telephone. Defontes is significant in that it refused to enforce a rolling
contract for a reason other than that a contract was formed at
178
purchase or order.
Instead, the Defontes court refused to enforce
the contract based on an application of the rationale of Specht.
The Defontes court distinguished ProCD and other cases that had
enforced deferred terms. The key distinction was that, although the
seller offered a “total satisfaction policy” pursuant to which the
purchased computer could be returned, the policy was not
sufficiently specific in informing the buyer that the computer could
be returned based on the buyer’s “unwillingness to comply with the
179
terms” inside the box.
The court noted that the “underlying
reasoning of the Specht decision is particularly poignant to this
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 557.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 557.
No. C.A. PC-03-2636, 2004 WL 253560 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2004).
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
2004 WL 253560, at *7.

FRIEDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

8/28/2006 4:29:41 PM

IMPROVING THE ROLLING CONTRACT

33

180

issue.”
According to the court, in Specht, the decision hinged on
whether a reasonable Internet user would have known of the
existence of the purported terms of the agreement. The court
employed the “same logic,” determining that the relevant question in
Defontes should be whether a reasonable purchaser would have known
that returning the computer would have constituted rejection of
those terms. The court held that a reasonable purchaser would not
181
have known this.
Defontes implicitly added another requirement to awareness of the
contractual nature of a document: it is not enough that a buyer
understand that a document is contractual in nature. The buyer
must also understand that the contract terms at issue are “live”—that
is, terms the buyer can still do something about by returning the
product or canceling the service. Such a requirement is particularly
important in rolling contracts where a buyer is far more likely to be
presented with something referenced as “terms and conditions” than
with something referenced as “proposed terms and conditions.”
In enhancing the obviousness of contractual significance, the sole
focus should not be on the document in which the deferred terms
are ultimately presented. It is easy enough for a seller to include a
document containing only contract terms (excluding any instructions
or other information that might distract from the contractual nature
of the document) inside the shipping box. The seller could even
print “THIS IS A CONTRACT” on the front for good measure.
Such a solution misses the point. It is not the particular form or
appearance of the document on which the deferred terms are found
that matters. What matters is whether the buyer will have sufficient
reason to locate and read the document in the first place and to
understand that the statement of “terms” is actually a statement of
“proposed terms” which the buyer may accept or reject.
The segregation of boilerplate terms from key terms (such as price
and product description) warrants special scrutiny. That separation,
both in method and time, weakens a reasonable purchaser’s
perception of the contractual significance of post-purchase
documents and actions. In other words, the purchase or order gives
182
rise to a sort of “mini” course of performance, establishing the way
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. A course of performance, at least under the Uniform Commercial Code,
exists when a contract “involves repeated occasions for performance by either party
with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it
by the other.” U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (2005). A course of performance “accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
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in which terms are presented and accepted (or at the very least,
providing a benchmark).
In a traditional agreement with
standardized terms, those terms are presented in the same way and at
the same time as the key terms and all such terms are accepted by a
signature or a purchase. In a rolling contract, however, key terms are
likely presented in the context of the purchase or order and are
presented orally or, if in writing, colloquially, before the buyer has
taken possession of the goods or begun using a service. These key
terms are typically accepted by the purchase or order. In contrast,
the agreement’s standardized terms are likely presented in densely
written legalese and provided after the buyer takes possession of a
purchased item or begins using a service. They are accepted by
keeping the good or continuing with the service.
The break between key terms and standardized terms is typically so
complete that the “Terms and Conditions” provided after the
purchase or order are invariably not really the “Terms and
Conditions” of the contract since they are quite unlikely to include
such terms as product description or purchase price. Thus, the
presentation of “pure” boilerplate, unadulterated by what a buyer
might actually consider relevant contract terms, should be subject to
special scrutiny. In other words, a buyer may only register “contract
terms about which I can do something,” when the buyer sees key
terms, such as price.
The divide between the key terms and the standardized terms is
quite large in rolling contracts. Template Notice provides a way of
reducing that divide. It presents the deferred terms, albeit in an
abbreviated form, at the time of purchase and in the same context as
the key terms. It also makes clearer that deferred terms are not final
but may be rejected by returning the product or canceling the
183
service.
Finally, Template Notice would make clearer, in a larger
sense, that the transaction is not complete at the purchase or order
and that what is received and what happens afterwards may be
“contractual in nature.”

agreement.” Id.
183. Template Notice meets the objection of Defontes more squarely by putting a
buyer on much stronger notice from the outset of the transaction that the act of
keeping the goods will constitute acceptance of those terms and that the buyer does
have the right to avoid the transaction if dissatisfied with the contract terms.
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IV. BEYOND CONTRACT FORMATION: ADAPTING DOCTRINES USED TO
ASSESS STANDARDIZED TERMS TO ROLLING CONTRACTS
The focus on the mechanics of contract formation that has largely
dominated the analysis of rolling contracts to date has effectively
sidelined other tools that might be used to assess the deferral of
terms. In this Section, I discuss unconscionability and reasonable
expectations. For each, I provide an overview, describe how the
doctrine has been marginalized by courts assessing rolling contracts,
and propose how these doctrines could be applied to the deferral of
terms. Were courts to apply these doctrines, it would not spell doom
for rolling contracts. It would instead result in the improvement of
the rolling contract through the addition of Template Notice to these
transactions.
184

A. Unconscionability
1.

Overview of unconscionability
A term or a contract may be deemed unenforceable because it is
185
unconscionable under both the common law and the Uniform
186
Commercial Code.
Unconscionability “has generally been
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
187
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”
Unconscionability includes both a procedural aspect, which focuses
188
and a
on “deficiencies in the contract formation process,”
substantive aspect, which focuses on whether the challenged contract
189
or term is “unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side.” A party
seeking to establish unconscionability must generally demonstrate
190
both aspects, although not necessarily to the same degree (that is,
184. Much of what was said in the previous part of this Article is relevant here, as
well, since Karl Llewellyn’s analysis of assent to standardized terms provides the
foundation for unconscionability. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §4.28 (3d
ed. 1999) (noting that Llewellyn is credited with the authorship of U.C.C. § 2-302 (1)
(2005)).
185. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
186. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005).
187. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 449.
188. Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 744 (Md. 2005) (quoting 8
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18.10 (4th ed. 1998)).
189. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).
190. See, e.g., Trend Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 411, 415 (Ct.
App. 2005) (ruling that both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be
present, but that the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less
evidence of procedural unconscionability is required); Clark v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 706 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“In order for a contract or
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pursuant to a “sliding scale” approach, the “more substantively
oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
191
unconscionability is required and vice versa”). A few courts appear
to have been satisfied with substantive unconscionability alone, even
192
in the absence of procedural unconscionability.
2. Formation and unconscionability: judicial reluctance to the serious
evaluation of rolling contracts for procedural unconscionability
Courts have generally been content to let the discussion of contract
formation and of the practical difficulties of complete pre-purchase
disclosure in ProCD and Hill insulate the deferral of terms from
claims of procedural unconscionability. Prior to ProCD, at least two
courts raised concerns (albeit in the context of a discussion of
whether terms should become part of a contract under the U.C.C.’s
193
“battle of the forms” provision) about the structure of rolling
contracts, noting that the time and energy a buyer invests in a
purchase might work as a strong disincentive for the buyer to exercise
194
a right to return a purchased item.
Unfortunately, exploration of this line of analysis seems to have
largely ended after ProCD and Hill. For instance, in Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., decided shortly after Hill, the court rejected a claim that a
contract involving deferred terms was a contract of adhesion and
indicated that deferred terms should be treated like any other type of
term:

contract provision to be considered unconscionable, both procedural and
substantive unconscionability must be present.”); see also Jeffrey Mining Prod., L.P. v.
Left Fork Mining Co., 758 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
“[t]he unconscionability doctrine consists of two prongs:
(1) substantive
unconscionability . . . and (2) procedural unconscionability”).
191. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000).
192. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58-59 (Ariz. 1995)
(holding that despite the fact that “perhaps a majority” of courts have held that there
must be at least some quantum of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability, a claim of unconscionability can be established under Arizona’s
version of the U.C.C. with a showing of “substantive unconscionability alone”);
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574-75 (App. Div. 1998) (holding
that procedural unconscionability is not always required for a finding of
unconscionability).
193. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005).
194. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991)
(stating that the vendor may have been relying on the purchaser’s investment in time
and energy in reaching a point in the transaction so as to prevent him from
returning the item); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759,
766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (stating that “purchasers often invest considerable time and
money before ordering goods, and, therefore, are somewhat less likely to return
goods once they arrive”).
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While returning the goods to avoid contract formation entails
affirmative action . . . and even some expense, this may be seen as a
trade-off for the convenience and savings for which the consumer
opted [by choosing to avoid on-site retail shopping]. That a
consumer does not read the agreement or thereafter claims he or
she failed to understand or appreciate some term does not
invalidate the contract any more than such claim would undo a
195
contract formed under other circumstances.

In other words, rolling contracts are to be treated no differently than
other types of standardized contracts.
Hill and ProCD seem to have put the “stamp of approval” on
deferred terms even with respect to claims of procedural
unconscionability (despite the fact that the issue of unconscionability
196
was not raised in either of those cases). For instance, in O’Quin v.
197
Verizon Wireless, the court enforced an arbitration clause in a terms
and conditions pamphlet inside the packaging of a purchased
198
telephone handset.
The court first noted that the provision was a
part of the agreement, because opinions like Hill found nothing
“overwhelmingly objectionable in the ‘money now, terms later’
199
approach to sales of consumer goods.”
Later in the opinion, the
court rejected a claim of procedural unconscionability, noting (again
with a citation to Hill) that courts have “countenanced some
modicum of adhesionary terms, or evidence of procedural
unconscionability in contract formation, in the name of economic
200
efficiency.”
201
Similarly, in Stenzel v. Dell Inc., the court rejected a claim that an
arbitration agreement sent after a computer had been purchased was
unconscionable. In response to the purchasers’ claim that the
contract was procedurally unconscionable because it had not been
freely negotiated, the court stated that there was “substantial case law
202
The first case the court cited for this
on point to the contrary.”
proposition was Hill and the remaining citations were to cases
203
following the reasoning of Hill on contract formation.

195. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (App. Div. 1998).
196. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (pointing
out that no claim of unconscionability was asserted); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (unconscionability not discussed in the opinion).
197. 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003).
198. Id. at 516.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 517.
201. No. CIV-03-323, 2004 WL 1433657 (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2004).
202. Id. at *3.
203. Id.
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The unconscionability of the deferral of terms was also apparently
204
raised in M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., but the
court refused the invitation to address the issue fully. Mortenson
involved a limitation on consequential damages included as part of a
shrinkwrap license that had not been presented to the buyer until
205
after the purchased software had been ordered.
The purchaser
challenged the limitation as procedurally unconscionable, arguing
that “the license terms were never presented to [the purchaser] in a
206
contractually meaningfully way,” an apparent reference to the fact
that the license terms were not discussed or disclosed at the time of
purchase. The court addressed the issue, however, by simply looking
to factors that are more conventionally relevant to claims of
procedural unconscionability: the provisions were not in fine print,
the license was printed in capital letters on the diskette pouches and
in the instruction manuals, and the buyer was a sophisticated
207
purchaser. The court simply did not address whether the deferral
of the terms itself was procedurally unconscionable. This failure on
the part of the court was probably due to the fact that the court had
already, in a lengthy discussion, endorsed the deferral of terms with a
208
return option as a valid way in which to form contracts. In essence,
the contract formation discussion took the wind out of the
unconscionability argument.
3.

Applying unconscionability to the deferral of terms
That the mechanics of offer and acceptance can be made to “work”
in rolling contracts should not be the end of the analysis. Under
both the U.C.C. and the common law, the unconscionability analysis
209
assumes that a contract has been formed —the fact of formation
should merely begin the analysis. Procedural unconscionability is not
limited to offer and acceptance, but instead “broadly encompasses a
210
whole host of circumstances surrounding contract execution.”
Key indicators of procedural unconscionability are whether there is
a lack of voluntariness or a lack of knowledge of the provisions at
204. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
205. Id. at 315.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 311-14.
209. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2005) (providing that a court is to determine whether
contract or provision of contract was unconscionable “at the time [the contract] was
made”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (explaining that the
court should assess unconscionability as of “the time the contract is made”).
210. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary:
U.C.C. Article 2 and the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N. M. L. REV. 359, 365 (2001).
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211

issue. Both of these indicators are potentially implicated in rolling
contracts as they are presently structured. The decision to accept
deferred terms may simply reflect the investment of time and energy
in the transaction which creates an artificial pressure to proceed with
the transaction. A buyer who might have balked at a particular
provision presented before purchase may be willing to accept that
same provision once the buyer becomes embroiled in the
212
transaction.
Lack of knowledge, too, is potentially at issue in rolling contracts.
Among the factors considered in assessing procedural
unconscionability is whether a transaction involves “the hiding of
clauses which are disadvantageous to one party in a mass of fine print
trivia or in places which are inconspicuous to the party signing the
213
contract.” But just as within a single document there are places in
which terms may be placed to make them less obvious, the same is
true of the rhythm of an overall transaction. That is, it may be
possible to minimize a term’s impact by presenting it at a time other
than purchase. The post-purchase period may be the equivalent of a
214
single document’s fine print.
A transaction may be structured so that the main terms simply
overpower the standardized terms and minimize awareness of the
standardized terms. One arguably analogous case is John Deere Leasing
215
Co. v. Blubaugh.
In Blubaugh, the court found a lease provision
216
unconscionable. The provision at issue was on the back side of the
217
lease in “very light-colored, fine print.” Because the paper was thin,
the darker print from the front page was able “to show through to the
218
The resulting
back, making it difficult to see the fine print.”
difficulty in reading the standardized terms was among the factors
219
that led the court to find procedural unconscionability.
In
Blubaugh, the key terms overwhelmed the standardized terms. A
similar state of affairs exists in rolling contracts, where the front-

211. John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986).
212. See discussion of cognitive dissonance and the endowment effect, supra Part
III.B.1.
213. Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976).
214. Cf. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 121, at 479 (observing that sellers doing
business over the Internet have “avenues for tinkering with the presentation format
of their electronic boilerplate” to discourage consumers from actually reading the
terms).
215. 636 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Kan. 1986).
216. Id. at 1575.
217. Id. at 1571.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1574.
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loaded nature of the transaction serves to maximize what comes at
purchase and minimize what comes later.
Template Notice enhances both voluntariness and knowledge in
rolling contracts. Template Notice provides for disclosure of the
substance of terms at a time when attention is likely being paid to the
transaction and choice can be made freely, unencumbered by
concerns over time and expense that have already been sunk into the
transaction.
Additionally, a buyer proceeding with a transaction after receiving
notice of the types of terms being deferred has willingly and
knowingly put herself in the position of receiving full disclosure of
the precise text of the terms only after purchase or order. The initial
decision to proceed with the transaction is thus significantly better
informed than it would have been had there been no notice of
additional terms or only notice that some unspecified additional
terms would be forthcoming.
In short, the pressure of procedural unconscionability analysis
should result in sellers adopting Template Notice to avoid their
transactions being deemed procedurally unconscionable, a finding
that would put the substance of the terms under a scrutiny that they
might otherwise escape. Fully exposing the current structure of
rolling contracts (without Template Notice) to unconscionability
analysis might result in some courts determining that rolling
contracts are, as a class, sufficiently suspect that deferred terms be
deemed unenforceable even if substantive unconscionability is
220
present only to a comparatively small degree.
Sellers would thus
face the choice of either accepting this heightened scrutiny of
deferred terms or adopting Template Notice to alleviate judicial
concern over the deferral of terms.
B. Reasonable Expectations
1.

Overview of reasonable expectations
The reasonable expectations doctrine has two sources. It flows
both from Section 211(3) of the Restatement and from judicial
opinions assessing terms in insurance agreements. Some argue that
221
these two strands have essentially merged.
220. Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the
same extent. A larger degree of procedural unconscionability might offset a lesser
degree of substantive unconscionability, and vice versa. See discussion supra Part
IV.A.1.
221. See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitration in Montana, 66 MONT. L.
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Section 211(3) reflects Karl Llewellyn’s conception of assent to
222
standardized terms. It provides that generally signing or otherwise
assenting to a writing constitutes assent to all the terms contained in
223
the writing, whether or not these terms are read. An exception to
that general rule is provided in subsection (3), which states that
“where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting . . . assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not a part of the
224
However, parties to a contract “are not bound to
agreement.”
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
225
expectations.”
Along with unconscionability, Section 211(3)
represents one of the “most prominent judicial avenues” for dealing
226
with standardized terms.
Similarly, the doctrine of reasonable expectations has been
invoked by courts in the context of insurance agreements, and
protects against assent being deemed to have been given to terms
that, even if not unconscionable, are still beyond the reasonable
227
expectations of a party to the contract. Professor Keeton, who first
identified reasonable expectations as a principle underlying many
cases involving insurance coverage (although he noted that it
228
“surely . . . applies in other contexts as well”), described it as
follows: “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will
be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions
229
would have negated those expectations.”
As a corollary, “insurers
ought not to be allowed to use qualifications and exceptions from
coverage that are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a
policyholder having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of
230
coverage involved.”
REV. 139, 152 (2005) (treating the Restatement’s definition of unenforceable terms
as merging into reasonable expectations).
222. See Rakoff, supra note 120, at 1199 (noting that Section 211 “reflects
[Llewellyn’s] work, not just in its black-letter formulations, but in almost every
paragraph of its commentary as well”).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981) (providing that as long
as the requirements of this section are met, a party “sign[ing] or otherwise
manifest[ing] assent to a writing . . . adopts the writing as an integrated agreement
with respect to the terms included in the writing”).
224. Id. § 211(3).
225. Id. § 211 cmt. f.
226. Hillman, supra note 4, at 748.
227. For a brief summary of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see Burnham,
supra note 221, at 153-56.
228. Keeton, supra note 83, at 967.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 968.
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Although some jurisdictions have not adopted the reasonable
231
expectations doctrine, numerous other courts have adopted a
variety of versions of the doctrine. Some courts have adopted
reasonable expectations merely as a form of contra proferentem,
deferring to the reasonable expectations of the insured only if the
232
policy is ambiguous, and others have applied it only where the
agreement “contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if the fine print
233
purports to take away what is written in large print.”
In a third
variation, referred to by one commentator as the “whole transaction”
approach, reasonable expectations are enforced even if such
expectations are created by insurers’ “marketing patterns and general
practice,” and not just if such expectations are created by the
234
language of the agreement.
2. Implicit rejection of the application of reasonable expectations to the
deferral of terms
The application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations to the
deferral of terms was, at least arguably, implicitly rejected in dicta in
235
ProCD. After discussing the term at issue that restricted the use of
the purchased database to non-commercial uses, the court went on to
note that: “Ours is not a case in which a consumer opens a package
to find an insert saying ‘you owe us an extra $10,000’ and the seller
236
files suit to collect.”
The simplest distinction between the license
term and the $10,000 term is that while the buyer in ProCD should
231. See, e.g., Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 803, 805 (Idaho 2000)
(noting that the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected the concept of reasonable
expectations); Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Mich. 2003)
(rejecting doctrine of reasonable expectations under Michigan law). See generally
Paul N. Farquhason, Reasonable Expectations, in 1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 5.3(d)(1) (David Leitner et al. eds., 2002) (discussing
jurisdictions not accepting reasonable expectations); Roger C. Henderson, The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST L. J.
823, 834-38 (1990) (categorizing the jurisdictions that have not explicitly recognized
reasonable expectations and describing the specific differences among them).
232. See, e.g., Tsadilas v. Providian Nat’l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App. Ct.
2004) (holding that because the arbitration provision added to the contract was
clear, it was not necessary to ask about the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations), appeal
denied, 832 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2005). See generally Thomas J. Rueter & Joshua H.
Roberts, Pennsylvania’s Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: The Third Circuit’s Perspective,
45 VILL. L. REV. 581, 586-87 (2000) (describing opinions taking the contra proferentem
approach).
233. Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 928 (Del. 1982).
See generally Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1469-72 (1989) (collecting and describing other
cases adopting a similar approach).
234. Ware, supra note 233, at 1472-73.
235. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
236. Id. at 1452.

FRIEDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

8/28/2006 4:29:41 PM

IMPROVING THE ROLLING CONTRACT

43

reasonably have expected the license term, he could not have
reasonably expected a gigantic price increase.
Instead of
distinguishing the license term from the $10,000 term on the basis of
reasonable expectations, however, the court focused on contract
formation as the answer to the dilemma, noting that a buyer seeing
the demand for $10,000 could “prevent formation of the contract by
237
returning the package.”
Reasonable expectations as a tool to police the deferral of terms
was also implicitly rejected in Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet
238
Gateway.
Davidson involved the enforceability of license terms that
were referenced on the packaging of the purchased software and
239
were visible only after purchase. Although the buyers framed their
argument in terms of procedural unconscionability and a claim that
the contract was one of adhesion, the language they used was that of
reasonable expectations:
Defendants argue that the contract is adhesive because it fails to
square with the reasonable expectations of the parties, as no
average member of the public would expect to pay $49.99 for a
game and then be unable to use it when he or she gets home.
Defendants also argue that no reasonable person would expect to
be barred from installing the game he just bought unless he or she
240
is forced to comply with an [End User License Agreement].

The court rejected the argument without discussing reasonable
241
expectations.
3. Applying reasonable expectations to the deferral of terms
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has largely been restricted
to the assessment of insurance agreements, but it has been used in
242
When Professor Keeton articulated the
other contexts as well.
concept of reasonable expectations he stated that the doctrine has
243
applicability beyond the insurance context. The rolling contract is
an appropriate candidate for reasonable expectations. Rolling
contracts share an important characteristic with insurance

237. Id.
238. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d, Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422
F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
239. Id. at 1169-70.
240. Id. at 1179.
241. Id. at 1178-80.
242. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1257 n.199 (2003) (collecting cases from
contexts other than insurance in which the reasonable expectations doctrine was
applied).
243. See Keeton, supra note 83, at 967.
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contracts—they both involve a lapse of time between payment and
receipt of terms. This characteristic of insurance contracts is one of
the factors that led Professor Keeton to argue that insurance law
ought to embrace reasonable expectations. That is, when Professor
Keeton first articulated the concept of reasonable expectations he
244
Professor Keeton
was not just describing; he was also prescribing.
thought that insurance law ought to embrace reasonable
expectations because the delay between signing an insurance
agreement (and paying a first premium) and the receipt of the
detailed policy is a “factor enhancing the policy holder’s
245
disinclination to read his policy carefully or even to read it at all.”
Keeton’s description of insurance contracts applies equally well to
rolling contracts where the purchase precedes full disclosure of
standardized terms. In fact, insurance agreements are the first
example given in ProCD in support of the proposition that
246
transactions in which money precedes detailed terms are common.
Of course, concluding that the reasonable expectations doctrine
should be applied to rolling contracts does not answer the question
of precisely how the doctrine should be applied. Given the
247
functional primacy of the purchase in rolling contracts, information
at purchase should frame the expectations of buyers in rolling
contracts. This emphasis on information presented at purchase
reflects Professor Keeton’s view that a seller wishing to put a buyer on
sufficient notice of what would otherwise be an unexpected term
should do so “by calling it to the attention of a policyholder at the
248
time of contracting.”
In the modified version of reasonable
expectations for assessing the deferral of terms that I propose, the
key inquiry would be whether, given the context of the transaction
and the information provided at purchase, a buyer would reasonably
think a transaction was open or closed to a particular type of term. It
might be that some terms should be so expected under the
circumstances (as was arguably true of the provision in ProCD) that a
buyer would reasonably expect that type of provision. For the
244. See id. (noting that insurance law is moving in the direction of reasonable
expectations and that reasonable expectations is “a principle that insurance law
ought to embrace”).
245. Id. at 968.
246. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996). Additionally,
ProCD references Section 211, cmt. a of the Restatement as support for the
proposition that standardized terms can be useful. Id. And Professor Hillman, who
is generally supportive of rolling contracts, seems to consider Section 211 applicable
to rolling contracts, as well. Hillman, supra note 4, at 757.
247. See discussion supra Part III.D.
248. Keeton, supra note 83, at 968.
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majority of terms, however, and especially in consumer purchases,
Template Notice could be quite useful in helping to define the scope
249
Sellers could
of what is and is not an expected type of provision.
still defer terms, but only those that would “fill in the blanks.” Terms
250
could not be dropped in “out of the blue.”
Although courts generally have resisted applying reasonable
251
expectations to the deferral of terms, there is some indication of
the beginning of judicial unease with permitting sellers to add terms
virtually without limitation. The response has been along the lines
that I propose, with courts looking to the information provided at
purchase or order to establish the form of the transaction and
permitting only those terms that fill out the details. For instance, in
252
Reedy v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., the court refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement that had not been provided at the time of
253
Reedy involved the sale of “personal seat licenses”
purchase.
guaranteeing season ticket holders the ability to obtain a seat in a
254
specific area of a sports stadium.
After making their initial
payment, purchasers received a document with contract terms,
255
including an arbitration provision.
Two of the defendants argued
that the buyers of the seat licenses were on notice that there would be
256
additional contract terms after purchase. These defendants argued
that the brochure, which was sent to prospective buyers, included a
section of rules and regulations stating that after the buyers sent in
the first installment of the purchase price, a contract would be
forthcoming, and this “contract [would] outline all terms and
257
conditions of the [seat license] agreement.” The court rejected the
defendants’ argument, noting that the statement in the rules and
regulations did not put the buyers on notice of the arbitration
249. As I indicated earlier, some provisions will be so inconsequential that no
Template Notice of them need be given. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. Put
another way, a buyer probably reasonably expects in every transaction some relatively
minor contract terms.
250. I should clarify that Template Notice would only provide notice of reasonable
terms of the types identified in a Template Notice disclosure. That is, if Template
Notice indicated deferral of an arbitration provision, a buyer would be on notice of a
typical arbitration provision, but not an unduly oppressive one. Template Notice
would not immunize such oppressive terms from scrutiny—such unusual terms
would have to be fully and meaningfully disclosed at purchase to have the possibility
of being effective.
251. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
252. 758 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio App. Ct. 2001).
253. Id. at 680-81.
254. Id. at 680.
255. Id. at 681.
256. Id. at 684.
257. Id.
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258

provision. The court held that a reasonable buyer would not expect
an arbitration term or any other term that materially alters the
259
Instead, a buyer would expect only terms
agreed upon contract.
that would fill in “open terms,” such as a term specifying the exact
260
area of the stadium where the buyer’s seat would be located. The
court essentially used a reasonable expectations test to assess what
types of terms, in the context of the transaction at hand, a seller
could add to a transaction after purchase.
Cases dealing with the extent to which credit card issuers can
modify or add new terms to the initial cardholder agreement
pursuant to “change in terms” provisions also reflect a judicial
instinct for placing some subject matter limitation on the deferral of
some terms. Change in terms provisions, typical in credit card
agreements, give the card issuer the right to amend or change parts
of the original agreement. Several courts have grappled with what
provisions are included within the purview of change in terms
provisions, and the reasoning frequently employed is similar to that
of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
261
For instance, in Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., the court
assessed the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a credit card
contract that had been added pursuant to a change in terms
262
provision in the original agreement. Two years after the cardholder
opened the account, the credit card issuer mailed the cardholder a
notice indicating that unless the cardholder-plaintiff opted out, the
issuer would add an arbitration clause to the agreement. The issuer
also mailed a “rejection coupon,” which the cardholder never
263
returned.
The court held that the arbitration provision was not
264
enforceable. The change in terms provision was not such that the
cardholder “should have anticipated that the [issuer] would change
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 341 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
262. Id. at 191-92. The change in terms provision was as follows:
Changes in Terms. We may amend or change any part of your Agreement,
including the periodic rates and other charges, or add or remove
requirements at any time. If we do so, we will give you notice if required by
law of such amendment or change. Changes to the annual percentage
rate(s) will apply to your account balance from the effective date of the
change, whether or not the account balance included terms billed to the
account before the change date and whether or not you continue to use the
account.
Id. at 191.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 192.
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265

the method and forum for resolving disputes.”
The change in
terms provision and the surrounding sections of the agreement dealt
with rates and “finance charges, credit limits, periodic statements,
266
and membership fees,” but there was “no mention of dispute
267
resolution mechanisms.” According to the court, there was simply
“nothing [in the Customer Agreement that] suggest[ed] that [the
cardholder] intended to give such unlimited power to [the issuer of
the credit card] or that the law would sanction such a grant” to add
268
an arbitration provision. The court held that:
the terms discussed in the change in terms clause must supply the
universe of terms which could be altered or affected pursuant to
the clause. To hold otherwise would permit the [issuer] to add
terms to the Customer Agreement without limitation as to the
269
substance or nature of such new terms.

An arbitration clause was simply beyond the bounds of what was
270
contemplated by anything in the initial agreement.
Other courts have similarly held that only provisions contemplated
by the original agreement may be added, even if opportunity to
cancel the credit card if the terms are not acceptable exists. For
271
instance, in Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., the court assessed the
enforceability of an arbitration provision that the credit card issuer
sought to add to its existing cardholder agreement pursuant to a
272
change in terms provision.
The plaintiffs, who were cardholders,
argued that given the absence of any mention of dispute resolution in
the agreement, “they did not reasonably expect that [the card issuer]
could use its Change in Terms authority to add wholly new clauses
273
regarding uncontemplated subject-matter to the contract.”
The court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument and refused to enforce
274
the arbitration provision. Although the court indicated that use of
the credit card would have constituted acceptance of the arbitration
term, the fact that the credit card holders did not exercise the right
to opt-out did not make the arbitration provision a part of the
275
agreement.
The original contract was quite detailed, containing
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 197.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id.
No. Civ. A. 04-507, 2004 WL 1508518, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4, n.4.
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276

over thirty carefully worded clauses.
However, there was no
277
mention of arbitration or any other forum for dispute resolution.
The court noted that “nothing in these terms would alert a consumer
to the fact that [the credit card issuer] might later impose a term
278
abrogating their rights to pursue disputes in a civil forum.”
The
court distinguished between the ability of a card issuer to make small
changes to “‘accommodate the unexpected,’” on the one hand, and
“‘drastic changes’ which go beyond the scope of the provision
279
providing for changes,” on the other.
The purported change was
280
simply “beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”
281
The court in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery also made use of the
doctrine of “reasonable expectations” in refusing to enforce an
arbitration provision. The original agreement included a change in
terms provision stating that the card issuer has, “[a]s permitted by
law, . . . the right to change any term or part of this agreement,
including the rate of Finance Charge applicable to current and future
balances. [The issuer] will send me a written notice of any such
282
changes when required by law.” The issuer subsequently attempted
283
to add an arbitration provision to the agreement. Despite a public
policy favoring arbitration, the court held that the arbitration
provision “did not fall within the universe of subjects included in
[the] original cardholder agreement” since the original agreement
included no terms about alternative methods or forums for dispute
284
According to the court, the cardholder’s reasonable
resolution.
expectation would not “include allowing [the issuer] to add a term
285
not even hinted at in the original agreement.”
The court also
indicated that allowing the issuer to change its agreement “would
ignore the requirement of good faith implied in all contracts of
286
adhesion.”
287
Additionally, in Maestle v. Best Buy Co., the court assessed a change
in terms provision that did not include any mention of a method or

276. Id. at *2.
277. Id.
278. Id. at *4.
279. Id. (quoting Allstate Drilling Co. v. Martinelli, No. 02-5877, 2004 WL 253526,
at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2004)).
280. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981)).
281. 593 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
282. Id. at 426.
283. Id. at 426-27.
284. Id. at 434.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 432.
287. No. 79827, 2005 WL 1907282 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2005).
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288

forum for resolving disputes.
The court concluded that the
cardholders “could not anticipate that appellants, let alone a new
third party, would amend the agreement to add an arbitration clause,
since the amendment provision referenced only changes to
289
payments, charges, fees and interest.”
The court noted that
“nowhere in the contract [wa]s there a clause addressing forums of
290
dispute.”
Accordingly, the court held that the provision did not
291
authorize the credit card issuer to add an arbitration clause.
The cases just discussed—Stone, Perry, Avery, and Maestle—are all
relatively recent and may be seen as representing a mini-trend of
292
sorts. These cases may reflect some desire on the part of courts to
rethink the extent to which later terms can be added to agreements
and to resolve the question by assessing whether a contract should
fairly be deemed open or closed to a particular type of term.
Of course, an ongoing agreement like a credit card agreement
differs from the types of transactions focused on in this Article. The
credit card agreements are transactions completed before the
addition of new provisions. On the other hand, the holder of a credit
card clearly agrees that additional terms may in fact be added, while
in a rolling contract a buyer may only have some vague “notice” that
this may happen. This distinction may actually argue for a higher
level of scrutiny of deferred terms in rolling contracts. Nevertheless,
while rolling contracts are not precisely like credit card agreements,
the fluid nature of the credit card transaction makes it at least a close
cousin to the rolling contract. Courts that sense something less than
savory about rolling contracts may find themselves looking to these
288. See id. at *5. The provision provided that “We may change or amend the
terms of this Agreement upon fifteen (15) days prior written notice if required by
law. Any change of amended fee, charge, interest rate, FINANCE CHARGE,
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE, or minimum payment amount . . . may be effective
to both the outstanding Account Balance and future transactions.” Id. at *6.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Some courts have taken a position contrary to these cases. Some of these
courts have enforced provisions added under change in terms clauses, not because of
contract law but because some state statutes explicitly authorize credit card issuers to
make unilateral changes to the agreements regardless of the scope of the original
agreement. See, e.g., Fields v. Howe, No, IP-01-1036-C-1, 2002 WL 418011, at *4-5
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2002) (finding Delaware statutory law permits unilateral addition
of an arbitration agreement); SouthTrust Bank v. Williams, 775 So. 2d 184, 190-91
(Ala. 2000) (finding that Alabama statutory law allows for unilateral additions to
cardholder agreements). Other courts have held that a general notice that any type
of change could be made is sufficient to include an addition of an arbitration
provision. See, e.g., BankOne, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830-31 (S.D. Miss.
2001) aff’d, 34 Fed. Appx. 964 (5th Cir. 2002); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
793 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
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credit card cases to find some way to cabin the seller’s ability to add
terms to the contract.
If the version of reasonable expectations I discuss had been applied
in Hill, for example, the court would likely have concluded that terms
fleshing out the warranty or the parameters of “lifetime support”
described in the advertisements were within the buyers’ reasonable
293
expectations.
Such terms would simply have been filling in the
details. But the arbitration clause would likely have been deemed
beyond the pale and would not have been enforced. Such a result
reflects an appropriate balancing of the needs and interests of both
buyers and sellers.
CONCLUSION
As rolling contracts continue to proliferate, it becomes ever clearer
that simply treating deferred terms as though they were provided
before or during purchase is, at best, a stopgap measure, not a viable
or fair solution. Courts must reassess, as some courts are beginning
to do, the nearly unfettered ability given to sellers to defer terms.
Template Notice provides courts with a workable and principled
mechanism for recalibrating the balance between buyers and sellers
in rolling contracts. Template Notice should be a particularly
attractive approach since it is a logical extension, but not upending,
of tools courts have routinely used to police standardized contracts.

293. For a full discussion of Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1997), see discussion supra Parts I and II.A.

